The International Court of Justice (ICJ) Whaling Case (Australia v. Japan, New Zealand intervening) was greeted by the popular press, particularly in Australia and New Zealand, as a win for “good science” as opposed to “bogus science”. However, in this article we argue that a closer analysis of the decision reveals that the ICJ - by sidestepping the crucial issue of how to define “scientific research” under the Whaling Convention - missed an opportunity to further the rule of law in international law, particularly as it applies to commons areas that require scientific cooperation and obligations.
Keywords : law,international law, whaling, whaling case, icj, international court of justice, australia, japan, governance, demarcation, scientific demarcation, scientific, rule of law, judicial, tribunal, treaty, commons
† PhD, LLB, GDLP, LLP, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania
# PhD, LLM, LLB, BA(Hons), Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania.
This article is based on a presentation by the Authors to the 7th Polar Law Symposium, Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies (IMAS), Hobart, Tasmania 28 to 31 October 2014. The article is a product of a project entitled ‘Resolving Scientific Disputes in the Global Commons’ supported by the Australian Governance and Implementation Research Group (GIRG). As one or more authors were members of the JLIS Editorial Board, double-blind peer review of this article was managed by an independent group of editors, overseen by the Associate Editor, Professor Dianne Nicol, in line with JLIS peer review policies.
© 2012 Journal of Law, Information & Science and Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania.